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tional DB plan, the
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(which is a defined
contribution plan),
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The funding of public-sector pensions has
been among the most hotly debated issues
in Illinois recently. State-funded pensions
currently do not have enough assets on
hand to pay all currently-promised bene-
fits. The public perception is that these
pension programs, as currently structured,
are not sustainable and are a drain on state
revenue. This chapter explains how these
public programs work, reviews the rele-
vant financial issues, and gives an
overview of options for reform.
There are five public-sector pension pro-
grams in Illinois: the State Employees’ Re-
tirement System (SERS) for employees of
the state government; the Teachers’ Retire-
ment System (TRS), which provides bene-
fits to most public school teachers
(teachers in the Chicago Public Schools
participate in a separate plan); the State
Universities Retirement System (SURS),
which provides benefits to employees of
public universities and community col-
leges; the Judges’ Retirement System (JRS),
which provides benefits to judges; and the
General Assembly Retirement System
(GARS) for members of the General As-
sembly. Most SERS participants also pay
into the Social Security system. Partici-
pants in the other pension programs do
not concurrently participate in Social Secu-
rity and thus their pension represents their
primary source of retirement savings. Par-
ticipants in all programs are part of the
Medicare system.
All five of these programs offer defined
benefit (DB) pensions.1 DB pensions are re-
tirement annuities in which the employee’s
monthly pension payment is determined by
a function of their salary and years of serv-
ice. For example, the current benefits for-
mula for TRS is 2.2 times a measure of final
salary times years of creditable service. The
pension programs are funded by a combi-
nation of contributions from employees and
contributions from each respective em-
ployer. For example, teachers contribute 9.4
percent of their salary toward the pension
program.
The unfunded liability of each program
refers to the difference between the assets
that each fund has on hand and the esti-
mated present discounted value of prom-
ised benefits. Figure 1 shows the estimated
accrued liabilities, assets, and the un-
funded liability for TRS, SERS, and SURS
as of November 2011. These three pro-
grams account for 98.5 percent of total lia-
bilities. For ease of exposition, balances for
JRS and GERS are omitted. The figure
shows that the accrued liability is $81.3 bil-
lion in TRS, $31.4 billion in SERS, and
$31.5 billion in SURS. Assets on hand are
considerably less in each program – 46.1
percent of the TRS liability is funded; 34.9
percent of the SERS liability is funded; and
45.3 percent of the SURS liability is
funded.
It is important to understand what this un-
funded liability represents. An unfunded
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the respective pension funds are not suffi-
cient to pay the projected future benefits
that state employers have promised. This
unfunded liability results from revenue
flowing into the pension fund at a slower
rate than future benefits are being accrued.
The existence of an unfunded liability does
not, on its own, imply that benefits are too
high or funding is too low; rather, there is
a mismatch between revenue and costs. Ei-
ther or both could be adjusted to bring the
system into balance (although, in this case,
Illinois’ unfunded liability is largely the re-
sult of the state not making its required
pension contributions). An unfunded lia-
bility does not mean that funds are not
available to pay pension payments this
year; it also does not mean that the state is
prevented from moving other funds into
the pension account to pay promised bene-
fits. For example, the state could raise ad-
ditional tax revenue or reduce spending on
other programs to increase the balance in
the pension fund.
The following sections of this chapter re-
view the 2010 pension reform law and
Senate Bill 512, a major piece of pending
legislation that may come up for a vote in
2012; ask what we should expect from a
compensation system in general and pen-
sion program in particular; discuss some
potential policy options that have received
less attention recently; and discuss options
to dispose of the accumulated unfunded
liability.
Recent Reforms and Proposals in Illinois
A state law enacted in April 2010 reduced
pension benefits in various ways for state
employees hired in 2011 or later. For newly
hired workers, the normal retirement age
is 67; employees hired before 2011 may re-
tire as early as age 55 if they have appro-
priate service credits. The final salary used
to calculate benefits for newly hired em-
ployees will be the highest eight consecu-
tive years out of the previous 10 years; the
final salary used to compute benefits for
employees hired before 2011 is the highest
four consecutive years out of the previous
10. In addition, the salary used to compute
the benefits for newly hired employees
will be capped at $106,800 (this cap is tied
to the Consumer Price Index and will in-
crease annually). These changes will gener-
ally have the effect of reducing the final
salary used to compute benefits and there-
fore reduce pension payments. Employees
hired before 2011 will have their pension
benefits increased by 3 percent per year.
For new employees, benefits will be in-
creased each year by the lessor of 3 percent
or one-half of the inflation rate. This will
slow down the growth in benefits after an
individual retires.
The 2010 law only affects benefits for em-
ployees hired after December 31, 2010.
There are also proposals to reduce benefits
for employees hired before 2011. Perhaps
the most well-known is Senate Bill 512,
which was proposed in the 2011 General
Assembly session but had not been voted
on at year’s end. This legislation proposes















































Note: Funding ratios are given above the bar indicating the unfunded liability.
Source: Illinois Commission on Government Forecasting and Accountability, November 2011 Monthly
Briefing, p. 9.
participate in a defined benefit plan would
have the option to retain their current plan
and contribute a substantially higher por-
tion of their pay, or switch to the same de-
fined benefit plan offered to new
employees. For example, SURS partici-
pants currently contribute 8 percent of
their salary to the plan; under the pro-
posed legislation this would rise to 15.31
percent for employees who elect to stay in
their current plan. TRS participants cur-
rently pay a 9.4 percent contribution; this
would rise to 13.77 percent. The state
would contribute 6 percent of employees’
salaries toward the plan. Beginning in
2017, employees’ contributions would be
adjusted annually to reflect the so-called
normal cost; i.e. the cost of benefits earned
in that year, less the state’s 6 percent con-
tribution. Employees who elect to switch
to the less-generous and less-costly plan
offered to new employees would con-
tribute 6 percent of their salary (Chicago
and Cook County employees would con-
tribute 7 percent of salary). They would
also keep the benefits they had earned be-
fore the switch, with the level of pay used
to determine this portion of their benefits
frozen.2
Existing employees would also have the
option to switch to a defined contribution
pension (DC) plan, referred to as the self-
managed plan. Employees currently in a
defined benefit plan who opt to switch to
the defined contribution plan would still
receive the defined benefit pension that
they had already earned, based on their
current levels of pay. They simply would
not accrue new benefits. It is important to
understand, however, that since DB pen-
sions base payments on a measure of
salary, freezing future accruals necessarily
reduces the value of previously earned
benefits for most groups of workers. Put
simply, a mid-career worker who switches
from a DB to DC plan will have her DB
benefits based on her relatively lower mid-
career salary at the time of the switch,
rather than the higher salary she would
have when she actually retires. It is very
difficult, if not impossible, to freeze future
accruals and leave all employees un-
harmed.3 Most employees who opt for the
DC plan would contribute 6 percent of
their pay toward their defined contribu-
tion account and the state would con-
tribute an equal amount (SERS employees
who contribute to Social Security would
contribute a little over 4 percent of their
pay toward the DC plan).
There is no doubt that this proposal repre-
sents a decline in the net value of the pen-
sion program. Employees hired before
2011 would either pay more money to
keep their current plan or switch to a less-
generous plan. The Illinois Constitution
contains what is known as the non-impair-
ment clause, which reads “Membership in
any pension or retirement system of the
State ... shall be an enforceable contractual
relationship, the benefits of which shall not
be diminished or impaired.” It is unclear
whether this clause allows the kind of
changes proposed in SB512. I refer readers
interested in understanding alternative
legal interpretations of the non-impair-
ment clause to Laurie Reynolds’ chapter in
“Public Pension Policy in Illinois: An Intro-
duction to a Crucial Issue.”4
Because SB512 raises the cost for employ-
ees to stay in their existing plan, it is likely
that many employees will switch to either
the less-generous defined benefit plan or
to the self-managed plan. The proposal’s
less-generous DB plan contains an earn-
ings cap so it is certainly the case that most
employees who expect to have earnings
above this limit will choose the self-man-
aged plan. These incentives put front and
center the question of what the appropri-
ate pension program should look like.
What Do We Want From a Public Pension
System?
A compensation system should strive to
attract and retain appropriate public60
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employees at the lowest cost to taxpayers.
Within the context of a total compensation
package, a well-designed pension plan,
and a benefits program more generally, can
make both employees and employers bet-
ter off. Employers can generally purchase
group insurance and annuity products
(such as DB pensions) at a lower cost than
what an employee would pay to get the
same product on their own. Both of these
products involve a shift in risk from the in-
dividual to the insurance company or pro-
gram sponsor. Health insurance, of course,
protects people from the risks associated
with uncertain medical expenses. Retire-
ment annuities protect against the risk that
a person will outlive their assets. While
health expenses and longevity are highly
uncertain for any particular person, the
distribution of these events within a large
group of people is quite predictable. Pool-
ing risks within an employee pool lessens
the riskiness of the group. Thus, health in-
surance and retirement annuities can be
provided at a lower per-person cost to a
group than to each individual on their
own. This provides a powerful incentive
for businesses and public-sector employers
to offer a compensation package that in-
cludes health insurance and a pension, and
a correspondingly lower salary. Employees
benefit because the salary reduction repre-
sents a lower implicit price for these prod-
ucts than what they would pay if they
bought the products on their own. (The
federal tax code provides further financial
incentives to offer health insurance and
pensions in a compensation package.)
One of the biggest misconceptions about
employee benefits is that employers give
them as “free add-ons” in a compensation
package and that employees do not give
up anything to get them. The truth is that,
in large part, employees pay for all of their
benefits in the form of a lower cash wage
or salary than they otherwise would have
received. When people choose which job to
apply for and ultimately accept, they con-
sider a range of factors: the salary, the
benefits, the commute time, whether the
boss is friendly, the intrinsic enjoyment
they derive from the work, among many
other things. They choose the job that
gives them the greatest overall benefit or
satisfaction. When comparing jobs that
offer different compensation packages,
such as one with a higher salary and less-
generous benefits versus one with a lower
salary and generous benefits, people im-
plicitly (or explicitly) trade off salary and
benefits.
There are two important consequences of
this for public pension design. The first is
that reducing the generosity of the pension
is equivalent to cutting salary: both repre-
sent a decline in total compensation. Cut-
ting the generosity of the pension may not
save as much money as it first appears if
the employer is then forced to offer corre-
spondingly higher salaries to attract and
retain the same quality workforce.
The second consequence is that the pen-
sion program should be designed to maxi-
mize the retirement security of employees
for a given cost level. That is, for a given
cost to the employer, the pension should
maximize the perceived value of the pen-
sion program to employees. While the cost
of pensions to the employer is surely im-
portant, as is the total cost of compensa-
tion, discussion of how to reform the
system seems quite disconnected from un-
derstanding the effect that various pro-
gram features will have on employees’
retirement security.
It is important to understand that thinking
about the right pension system for Illinois
public-sector workers should not be con-
nected to the existence of an unfunded lia-
bility. Whether we have a debt or not, we
want a compensation system in general
and a pension in particular that allows the
state to recruit and retain appropriate tal-
ent. A debt is a sunken cost. It needs to be
addressed, but the logic that says we
should have a less-generous pension so
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that the state can more easily pay off its
debts is mistaken. A better policy would
say that if we need to spend less money,
cut the program or employees that provide
the least amount of value per dollar to tax-
payers.
Finally, one frequently hears the complaint
that public employees receive pensions
that are too generous. This is not the cor-
rect way to think about the pension pro-
gram. What should matter to the state
government and to taxpayers is whether
the total compensation costs are appropri-
ate. There is some academic work that at-
tempts to measure whether public-sector
pay is at the appropriate level. But there is
not a consensus among researchers about
the appropriate way to credibly answer
this question or what the correct answer
happens to be. One issue is that it is inher-
ently difficult to find a good comparison
group for many classes of public-sector
workers. A second issue is that there are
many attributes of workers that are diffi-
cult to measure, but that affect earnings.
Understanding whether differences in
compensation are due to these unmea-
sured factors or because one group is
“overpaid” is quite difficult.
Options for Reform of the Public Pension
System in Illinois
The preceding discussion makes clear that
the state faces two separate and distinct
questions: the first is what should be the
optimal pension program for state employ-
ees moving forward. The second question
is how the state should dispose of the ac-
cumulated pension liabilities. This section
addresses the first question. The next sec-
tion addresses the second question.
An important issue raised by Senate Bill
512 is what role should defined contribu-
tion pensions play in the state of Illinois’
pension programs. Employee 401(k) plans
and other types of defined contribution
pensions have almost completely displaced
defined benefit plans in the private sector
over the last 30 years.5 There are many
reasons for this: defined contribution
pensions are portable, while DB pensions
tend to penalize workers who change jobs.
Defined contribution pensions give work-
ers a foray into the stock market that they
may not otherwise have. Finally, it is easier
for firms to administer these plans because
all contributions are made up-front, as
opposed to DB plans in which funds need
to be set aside to cover estimated future
payments.
Nearly all private-sector workers partici-
pate in Social Security and through this
program have a baseline, annuitized
source of retirement income. In an impor-
tant sense, private-sector DC plans are a
supplement to workers’ Social Security
wealth. That is not the case for Illinois
public-sector workers, except those in
SERS who do participate in Social Security.
For those employees not in Social Security,
giving powerful incentives to switch to a
DC-style pension will make it more diffi-
cult for them to have a stable, annuitized
source of income during retirement.
The primary benefit of shifting employees
into a DC-style pension is that it would force
the state to pay its pension obligations up-
front. The state would pay its share of con-
tributions to a DC pension each pay period,
just as employees make their own contribu-
tions. This would prevent the state from
falling behind in its pension obligations, as
it currently has done. Put differently, be-
cause DC pensions are funded upfront, they
are always fully funded. There is a signifi-
cant value to having a pension program that
is largely fully funded: it gives employees a
degree of certainty about their future pen-
sion. Under the current system, employees
don’t knowwhether the governor and legis-
lature will alter the pension in a way that re-
duces their future benefits. This uncertainty
is costly to the state because it reduces the
perceived value of the compensation pack-
age. Some individuals who would accept62
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employment with the current pension do
not because they perceive that the pension
promise will not be fulfilled.
An option that marries some of the bene-
fits of both DC and DB pensions is to intro-
duce a hybrid pension system in which
employees participate in smaller versions
of both types of programs. One example of
this is the “stacked” program proposed by
Alicia Munnell, the Peter F. Drucker Pro-
fessor of Management Sciences at Boston
College’s Carroll School of Management,
at the 2011 IGPA State Summit on pension
reform.6 In a system like this, an employee
would accrue benefits in a DB program
based on some base level of income, say
their first $50,000. Income above this
threshold would not lead to any additional
DB benefits, but a portion would be con-
tributed into a DC plan, perhaps matched
in part by contributions from the state. A
virtue of a hybrid system is that it pre-
serves a basic minimum annuitized source
of wealth for all state employees. A second
virtue is that it allows employees to reap
some of the benefits of both styles of pen-
sions. In particular, it gives employees a
degree of flexibility in their investment in-
struments and, depending on how it is de-
signed, flexibility in their level of savings.
Because uncertainty is costly, as long as the
state sponsors a DB plan it is important to
consider policies that give employees more
certainty that their promised benefits will
be paid. A large unfunded liability will al-
ways raise questions about whether the
state will pay promised benefits. The Illi-
nois Municipal Retirement Fund, which
administers pensions for local government
employees, is relatively well-funded be-
cause local governments are required by
law to make their annual payments. One
could imagine a law that prohibited the
state from skipping payments to its own
DB plans, which would force the state to
do some combination of cutting spending
on other programs, raising the necessary
tax revenue, or borrowing the money.
A separate policy issue is whether the state
should devolve responsibility for pension
funding to other areas of government. For
example, most human resource decisions,
including salary levels, in local schools and
state universities are made by the respec-
tive organizations (perhaps through a col-
lective bargaining arrangement). But the
pensions are designed and funded, in part,
by the state. Michael Hogan, president of
the University of Illinois, recently wrote in
the Chicago Sun-Times that the reduced pen-
sions proposed in Senate Bill 512 would
make it more difficult for the university to
attract highly skilled and highly mobile
faculty who have choices about where to
work.7 An alternative system is to let each
university and local school district (or com-
binations of them) operate and fund their
own pension. This would give each organi-
zation the flexibility to design a pension
that is most appropriate for their particular
employees. If the University of Illinois
wanted to offer more generous pensions
than, for example, the Illinois Department
of Revenue, it would have the flexibility to
do so and would pay the full cost.
What Are the Options for Disposing of the
Accumulated Pension Liabilities?
The unfunded pension liability is a claim
by current employees and retirees on fu-
ture government resources. As such, it is
conceptually the same thing as a loan
made by employees and retirees to the
government. There are four options for
disposing of the accumulated liabilities.
The state could simply renege on past
promises (that is, default on the implicit
loan), borrow additional money, raise ad-
ditional revenue, or reduce spending on
other programs. All of these options raise
both equity and efficiency issues.
Reneging on past promises means reduc-
ing benefits that already have been earned.
This raises legal issues that are beyond the
scope of this chapter. It also raises impor-
tant equity issues because a large part of
Institute of Government & Public Affairs
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the unfunded liability is a direct result of
the past decisions by the state’s elected
leaders to spend money on other pro-
grams, or keep taxes lower than they oth-
erwise would have been, instead of
making their required pension payments.
The important efficiency consequence of
reducing previously earned benefits is that
individuals in the future who are contem-
plating public-sector employment will dis-
count the value of deferred compensation
because they will likely perceive a poten-
tial for promised benefits to be reduced
after the fact.
Borrowing to fund the pensions simply re-
places an implicit debt with an explicit
one. The government’s total debt level is
unchanged. Nevertheless, this has some
advantages. In particular, it gives employ-
ees the certainty that funds are already set
aside and makes it less likely that their
benefits will be reduced at some future
point. Borrowing also makes the total cost
of government operations more transpar-
ent and shows that future pension liabili-
ties are not inherently different from any
other type of government borrowing. Since
debt payments must be made on a regular
schedule, whether the economy is doing
well or poorly, borrowing may make it
more difficult for the state to smooth its
spending over the business cycle. This in-
flexibility may be a good thing, however, if
it prevents the government from skipping
pension payments when times are tough
but not making correspondingly larger
payments during economic booms. A key
conclusion, though, is that when the state
borrows to fund its pension obligation, it
simply kicks the can down the road and
still needs to make real funding decisions
later. By borrowing, the state simply defers
making this decision and, in effect, pushes
the cost onto the next generation of tax-
payers and users of government services.
Some state governments have turned to
Pension Obligation Bonds as a way to fund
their pension programs. These are contro-
versial because government accounting
rules allow pension funds to essentially
count the spread between their assumed
rate of return on pension assets and the
cost of borrowing funds as an immediate
net gain in pension assets. Research by
Munnell et al indicates that these bonds
tend to be used by governments that are
cash-strapped and have taken on too much
investment risk.8
The alternative to borrowing or reneging
on the debt is to fund it through spending
cuts, increased revenue, or a combination
of these. Both have equity and efficiency
implications. Government services gener-
ate benefits that are, one would hope,
greater than their costs. Efficiency implies
cutting those services that generate the
least benefit per dollar of expenditures.
Raising revenue through taxation distorts
economic decision-making and leads some
people to avoid economic activity in which
they otherwise would engage. The value of
this reduction in economic activity is re-
ferred to as deadweight loss and repre-
sents the true cost of the tax. In general, to
minimize this deadweight loss, it is better
to have taxes that are assessed on as large
a tax base as possible, with as low a rate as
possible. That is, to raise a specific amount
of money, deadweight loss is minimized
by taxing (for example) all income or all
consumption, rather than introducing ex-
emptions that require the overall tax to be
increased.
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